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Abstract 
Over the past twenty years, important changes in the Italian health system have led to different 
approaches in organizing, delivering and financing health services throughout the regions of the 
country. This study aims to examine the impact these factors have had on efficiency. The 
methodology adopted is based on the developments in bootstrapping Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA). In particular, employing a two-stage procedure, we analyzed the impact that political 
interventions have produced on healthcare efficiency. The data, which were at the local health 
unit level for the period 2004-2005, were aggregated to the provincial level in order to take into 
account patient mobility. The study reveals that the organizational model adopted by the 
Lombardia region allows for the best results in healthcare efficiency. Second, administrative 
decentralization from the regional governments to local health units is a source of inefficiency. 
Third, adjusting the cost of delivering care, by taking into consideration regional health 
characteristics, improves efficiency. Finally, future policy interventions should make careful 
valuations of the impacts of patient mobility on healthcare efficiency. 
 
Keywords: healthcare efficiency, two-stage estimation, Data Envelopment Analysis, patient 
mobility, bootstrap.  
                                                             
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at theXII European Workshop on Efficiency and Productivity Analysis 
(EWEPA). Verona, Italy, June 22-24, 2011. 
1. Introduction 
The Italian National Health Service (Servizio Sanitario Nazionale, SSN) is funded by tax revenue 
and aims to ensure essential health care services (LEAs) for all Italian citizens and foreign legal 
residents. SSN, created in 1978 along the lines of the British National Health service [1], has 
undergone several reforms aimed at increasing its institutional and financial autonomy and 
introducing competition in the provision of health services. Understanding the impact that policy 
decisions have had on healthcare efficiency is crucial to identify the best practices in the 
management of public health services in Italy. To study these questions, we employed recent 
advances in DEA that allow, through the bootstrap technique, for inferences based on DEA 
measures [2]. Most of the current literature we examined did not consider the possibility of 
making inferences based upon DEA results. Applying DEA, Retzlaff-Roberts et al. [3] studied the 
health care efficiencies of 27 OECD countries to identify the best health systems. Similarly, the 
papers by Aletras et al. [4], Kotodimopoulos et al. [5] and Linna et al. [6] used DEA analysis to 
investigate the efficiencies of the national health systems of Greece, Finland and Norway, 
respectively. A limited number of papers used the non-parametric techniques in an inferential 
setting [7, 8, 9]. 
In the literature focused on the Italian health care system, Barbetta et al. [10] found a decline in 
technical efficiency, mainly due to public policies aimed at reducing hospitalization rates. 
Additionally, Daidone et al. [11] restricted their analysis to the hospitals in a particular region and 
concluded that the organizational structure and level of specialization of the hospitals in question 
heavily affected technical efficiency. The remaining papers on the Italian health system discussed 
the effects of different approaches to reform. In particular, Tediosi et al. [12] pointed out that the 
central government has an important role in containing healthcare expenditures and helping in the 
enforcement of decentralization. They also highlighted that when there are differences in 
administrative and policy skills, decentralization may lead to undesirable divergent evolution 
paths. Ferrario et al. [13] concluded that the process of fiscal and administrative decentralization 
raises policy issues concerning the different health care spending possibilities across regions and 
the impact on interregional patient mobility. Gitto [14] examines change in productivity 
experienced by Italian Hospitals between 2001 and 2005. He find evidence of decreased 
productivity over the sample period as well as technological regress. 
Departing from previous studies on the Italian SSN, this present paper employs the new semi-
parametric technique developed by Simar and Wilson [2] to assess the efficiency of the Italian 
health system at the provincial level. Moreover, it attempts to address questions concerning the 
impact that organizational models, reimbursement systems and patient mobility have on 
healthcare efficiency.  
In the next Section, we introduce the Italian health care system. Section 3 discusses the 
methodology used in our empirical analysis. Data and variables are described in Section 4, and in 
Section 5, we present the empirical findings. Section 6 offers some concluding remarks and 
discussion. 
 
2. The Italian health care system 
The Italian SSN is made up of three decision makers: 1) the central government, 2) the 21 
regional governments
2
 and 3) the local health units. (see [15, 16] for a more extensive 
discussion).  
The local health units in Italy comprise a number of organizations: local health enterprises 
(Aziende Sanitarie Locali, ASL), public hospital enterprises (Aziende Ospedaliere, AO), National 
Institutes for Scientific Research and private accredited providers (for-profit and not-for-profit). 
ASLs
3
 are public providers that are responsible, on a territorial basis, for assessing healthcare 
needs and providing a full range of direct services either through their own facilities or by 
purchasing such services from the AOs
4
, research hospitals
5
 or accredited private hospitals.
6
 This 
territorial configuration resulted from several reforms begun in 1992, which have led to this 
regionalization and the application of the theory of managerialism in the provision of health care 
                                                             
2
The Italian Constitution defines 20 regions, but the SSN divides the Trentino Alto Adige region into two areas: 
Bolzano and Trento. 
3 In 2005, there were 195 ASLs (www.salute.gov.it). The number of inhabitants assigned to each ASL ranges from 
50,000 to 200,000. 
4
 In 2005, there were 102 AOs ( www.salute.gov.it ). AOs provide highly specialized tertiary hospital care. 
5
 In 2006, the National Institutes for Scientific Research comprised a network of 10 public university Policlinics and 55 
Institutes for scientific care and treatment (www.salute.gov.it). 
6 In 2009, ASLs contracted out services to 553 private hospitals [15]. 
services. The reforms have created the existence of a quasi-market mechanism and have increased 
the power of the central government in determining quality standards [16]. Moreover, the reforms 
have strengthened the principle of a prospective payment system (PPS) based on Diagnosis-
Related Group (DRG).  They have also established financing schemes for specific activities by 
requiring all health structures to be financed by predefined budgets composed of two elements: a 
payment for inpatient and outpatient care dictated by predefined rates based on DRG and a 
payment based on the average costs to deliver care [15].  
The central government sets the general objectives and fundamental principles for the national 
health care system. Each year, it defines the set of LEAs that must be provided uniformly 
throughout the country and determines the standard costs for these services. The funds collected 
by the central government, through general and payroll taxes, for the provision of LEAs are 
allocated to the regional units on an adjusted capitation basis. The central government also sets 
the standard rate of payment for treatment based upon the average cost of delivering care to a 
patient with that condition and assigns a specific weight
7
 to each DRG.  
regional governments are responsible for legislative and administrative health functions, planning 
health care activities, organizing supply in relation to population needs and monitoring quality, 
appropriateness and efficiency of the services provided [15]. The regional governments have the 
power to raise taxes, which allows them to provide health services in addition to those defined in 
the LEA [17]. Moreover, these governments can modify the tariffs set by the central government 
to accommodate the characteristics of the particular health organizations in their regions. The 
greater independence given to the regional governments has accelerated the fragmentation of 
reimbursement systems and the organization of regional services within the healthcare system 
[18]. 
Currently, there are three alternative reimbursement systems applied by different regional 
governments in Italy [19]: 
                                                             
7
 The weight reflects the average level of resources used by an average medicare patient in the DRG relative to the 
average level of resources used by all medicare patients. 
 “cost adjusted”: the national DRG weights are used, but the national average costs to deliver 
care are adjusted to reflect regional characteristics of the health organization and population 
health structure; 
 “analytic”: the average cost to deliver care to a patient with a particular disease is measured by 
analyzing the costs from a sample set of the regional hospitals, and the resulting average cost 
is then applied to each DRG; 
 “national”: the national DRG cost table is adopted; however, under this system there remains 
variation among a small number of specific DRGs, which reflects peculiarities across different 
types of regional hospitals. 
According to Jommi [18, 20] and Mazzei [19], there are also three readily identifiable 
organizational models (see Figure 1): 
 “ASL centred template”: the regional government finances ASLs on a capitation basis. ASLs 
sign service agreements with public and private accredited providers.  
 “Region centred template”: the regional government exercises a purchaser role, and it 
finances providers directly based on their activity. This governance form reduces the 
autonomy of the ASLs.  
  “Purchaser-provider split template”: there is a separation between purchasers and providers. 
Private accredited providers and AOs are the only organizations available to offer services, 
and they are reimbursed though tariffs. In this organizational model, AOs and private 
accredited hospitals act as providers of services, and ASLs act as purchasers. This model is 
only used in the Lombardia region. 
 
(Insert Figure 1 about here) 
 
Other key factors concern the reduction of the number of ASLs (from 659 in 1992 to 195 in 2005) 
to gain scale advantages,  the right for the patients to be admitted to any local health unit, even if 
it is outside their district of residence and the introduction of the law on federalism (Legislative 
Decree 56/2000), which has enabled regional governments to finance public services through 
regional taxes. These factors might have a significant impact on the SSN. In fact, poor regions, 
characterized by lower tax revenues, may be unable to guarantee the same services provided by 
other regions, in terms of quality and/or quantity, thus contributing de facto to their patient 
outflows [21] (see Table 1). Furthermore, the economic compensation among regions due to 
interregional patient mobility could undermine the main pillar of the SSN because the low-
income regions might prove unable, without central government intervention, to ensure a 
minimum level of quality in their healthcare system. Therefore, considering the impact caused by 
patient mobility may shed new light on the efficiency of the Italian SSN. Unfortunately, data on 
patient mobility are not available at the level of the health organization (e.g. ASL, AO) but only 
at the level of the province, which is a territorial and administrative division between 
municipality and region.  
We now focus our analysis on the provinces
8
 and as consequence, merge the data regarding 
health organizations within the same province. 
 
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
 
3. Methodology 
To analyze the effect of environmental variables on provincial healthcare efficiency, we 
employed a two-stage procedure. In the first stage, we estimated healthcare efficiency from 2004 
to 2005 for each province through DEA [22]. Following the related literature on the argument 
[10, 23, 24], we adopted an output-oriented model. The output-oriented model was preferable 
because in Italy, as in other countries, the policy focus on reducing the public deficit has 
compelled health organizations to keep the amount of resources consumed constant, even while 
increasing the extent of health services provided. 
Moreover, we made use of standard assumptions about the production set to analyze efficiency in 
an inferential setting [25]. The traditional DEA-estimator is biased by construction, and it is 
affected by uncertainty due to sample variation [2, 25, 26]. To remove these drawbacks, we 
                                                             
8 In 2005, there were 103 provinces in Italy. 
applied the procedure based on the bootstrap technique proposed by Simar and Wilson [26] to 
derive the sampling distributions and to construct confidence intervals. In the second stage, again 
following Simar and Wilson [2], we ran truncated regressions in a bootstrap setting to assess the 
effects of environmental variables on healthcare efficiency. 
To facilitate the interpretation of the results in the following sections, it is useful to recall that in 
the output-orientated DEA model, under the hypothesis of variable return to scale (VRS), an 
efficiency score itDˆ  is calculated for each decision making unit (DMU) i (i=1,2,…n) at time t 
(t=1,2,…,T) by solving the following linear program: 
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In this equation, itˆ  and itDˆ are the Farrell [27] and Shepard [28] distance functions, n is the 
number of DMUs and T is the number of time periods; Yt is an sxn matrix of s outputs, Xt is an 
rxn matrix of r inputs, λ represents a nx1 vector of weights which may obtain a convex 
combination between inputs and outputs and 1’ is a vector of ones.  
itˆ  is an inefficiency measure and always assumes values equal to or greater than one. As 
opposite, itDˆ  is an efficiency measure, and it assumes values between zero and one. DMUs with 
efficiency scores equal to one are located on the frontier, and as a consequence, their outputs 
cannot be further expanded without a corresponding increase in inputs.  
However, this relationship (Equation 1) did not allow us to determine whether the efficiency 
values are real or merely an artifact of the fact that we did not know the true production frontiers 
and had to estimate them from a finite sample [25]. Therefore, following the authors cited above, 
we employed a consistent bootstrap estimation procedure in order to correct the efficiency scores. 
The idea underlying the bootstrap is to approximate the sampling distributions of ˆ  by simulating 
their data generating processes (DGP). In other words, given the estimates itˆ  of the unknown 
true values of 
it , through the DGP processes, we generated a series of pseudo-datasets to obtain 
the bootstrap estimate, 
*ˆ
it . If the bootstrap is consistent, then: 
    ** ˆˆ~ˆ SS itit
approx
itit      i=1,2,…,n  t =1,2,…, T   (2) 
In this equation, S  and *S  denote the observed and the bootstrap samples, respectively. We used 
the smooth bootstrap procedure proposed by Simar and Wilson [26] to obtain sampling 
distribution of efficiency score, through which we derived the bias-corrected confidence intervals.  
The econometric model in our two-stage analysis takes the form of a truncated regression model: 
ititit ε
ˆ  βz     i=1,2,…, n; t =1,2,…, T  (3) 
Here itˆ  are obtained by (Equation 1), itz  is a set of explained variables for each unit i at time t, 
and 
itε is  σ0,N  with left-truncation at βz1 it .  
Traditional second-stage approaches suffer from various deficiencies. To overcome these 
problems, the regression parameters were estimated by truncated regression with a double 
bootstrap method [2]. The algorithm was implemented through the FEAR software library [29] 
linked to the statistical package R. 
 
4. Data and variables 
Data were collected from the Italian Ministry of Health
9
 and from the “Health for All” database.10 
They covered the period 2004-2005 and were the most recently available data. Because the 
decision making unit in question is the province, the data about ASLs, AOs, the National 
Institutes for Scientific Research and private accredited hospitals were aggregated to the 
provincial level. After eliminating the observations with missing values, the sample consists of a 
balanced panel of 101 provinces
11
. Using provinces as decision making units allows for a 
homogeneous comparison among production units. These comparisons were facilitated by the 
fact that the regional governments allocate healthcare resources at the provincial level by taking 
into account population needs [15].  
                                                             
9 www.ministerosalute.it 
10 www.istat.it 
11 Two provinces, Gorizia and Terni, are not in the sample. 
We specified three inputs (physicians, nurses and number of beds) and two outputs (number of 
total patients and number of inpatient days). The inputs and outputs are measured in terms of 
physical quantities, as no reliable price data are available. The physicians input is measured by 
the number of salaried physicians and dentists; the nursing input is measured by the number of 
paid nurses. Because direct measurement of capital in health care industry is problematic, we 
used the number of beds as a proxy for capital investment [30, 31]. 
The empirical literature regarding the estimation of efficiency in health care strongly suggests 
that the number of total patients (measured in this paper by the sum of  total discharged patients) 
is the most reliable measure of output [9, 32]. Because the inpatient admission is related to the 
tariff scheme [15], we considered also the number of inpatient days as output [33, 34] in order to 
account for the differences arising from the adoption of alternative reimbursement systems. 
Additionally, inpatient admission is more resource intensive than ambulatory care, and taking 
both of these aspects into account may help to explain the varying input usage by different health 
organizations. 
To consider the severity of the illness treated or the intensity of treatment received, outputs were 
multiplied by the case-mix index (ICM) [33, 35]. The performance of the healthcare system is 
influenced by external factors that managers cannot control but can impact efficiency. Although 
we did not use all these environmental variables to construct the frontier, they are clearly relevant 
in the second stage in order to assess their impact on healthcare efficiency. In particular, we 
considered six environmental variables: the organizational model, the reimbursement system, the 
total patients outflow, the total patients inflow, the interregional patients outflow and the 
interregional patients inflow. The different types of organizational models are described by two 
dummies. The first indicates if the organization structure is a purchaser-provider split template, 
and the second indicates if the region adopted an ASL centred template. To capture the effects of 
the different reimbursement systems used by the regions, we included two further dummies. The 
first shows if the reimbursement system adopted is national and the second if it is analytic. The 
variables total patients outflow, total patients inflow, interregional patients outflow and 
interregional patients inflow describe the different typologies of patient mobility that might affect 
healthcare efficiency. Total patients outflow and inflow measure both movements among 
provinces within the same region and movements among provinces in different regions. Through 
these variables, we considered, at the provincial level, the impact that patient mobility has on 
efficiency. However, as mentioned above in Section 2, the quality and the quantity of the services 
offered may differ among regions because only a minimum level of care must be guaranteed. 
Moreover, the differences among the offered health services have been increased by the law on 
fiscal federalism, which affects the capacity of regional governments to finance public services 
[20, 36]. Thus, to take into account of differences in quality and quantity in the health services 
offered, we introduced the variables interregional patients inflow and outflow, which describe 
patient mobility among provinces in different regions, into the analysis. Finally, a dummy 
variable year was included as a control variable. 
Combining the two alternative output specifications and the two measures of patient mobility, we 
obtained four different models to assess the efficiency of the Italian health system at the 
provincial level (see Table 2). 
 
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
 
Table 3 presents some descriptive statistics for the inputs and the outputs used in DEA and for the 
continuous variables employed in the two-stage regressions. 
 
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
 
An analysis of Table 3 shows that the data are right skewed, which supports our choice to use a 
non-parametric estimator, as discussed by Wilson and Carey [37]. 
 
5. Estimation results  
We estimated efficiency scores associated with the two different DEA models
12
 following the 
methodology defined in Section 3. The results were obtained from 2,000 bootstrap iterations. In 
Figure 2, the bootstrap estimates of confidence intervals for efficiency are classified by the three 
organizational models and sorted by their lower bounds. Results for the ASL centred template and 
the Region centred template appeared quite similar in distribution, whereas provinces adopting 
the purchaser-provider split template, characterized by confidence intervals more closed to the 
frontier, showed the best results in efficiency. 
 
(Insert Figure 2 about here) 
 
To better investigate the above evidence, we ran the adapted Li test for equality of efficiency 
distribution [38], as modified by Simar and Zelenyuk [39]. The null hypothesis of equal 
distribution of efficiency scores among organizational models was rejected at a 1% significance 
level for all of the cases (see Table 4). This implies that a significant difference exists among the 
distributions of the three organizational models.  
 
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
 
The Lombardia region is the only one that has adopted the purchaser-provider split template 
model, and as reported in Table 1, its SSN expenditures per capita are lower than the mean 
expenditures of the other Italian regions. In Lombardia, the ASLs are characterized by a high 
degree of autonomy in both organization and the management of health services. However, this 
autonomy has been bounded by stricter financial requirements, and these features have 
contributed to the ability of the region to guarantee higher standards of health services to be 
offered to patients [40, 41]. 
Second stage results
13
 from the double bootstrap estimation are presented in Table 5. 
                                                             
12 DEA efficiency scores are the same for models A and B and for models C and D (see Table 2).  
13 Because Simar and Wilson [2]’s algorithm employs the Farrell measure of efficiency, parameters with a negative sign 
indicate sources of efficiency and those with a positive sign indicate sources of inefficiency. 
 (Insert Table 5 about here) 
 
An analysis of the results in model A shows that the coefficient of the total patients outflow and 
inflow are statistically significant at a 10% level and are of opposite signs. In particular, while the 
total patients inflow increases the efficiency of a health organization at the provincial level, the 
total patients outflow reduces it. This result implies that, on average, the Italian provinces should 
reduce their health productive inputs. The organizational model, purchaser-provider split 
template, allows for efficiency gains when compared with the Region and the ASL centred 
template models, confirming the evidence obtained through the analysis of the efficiencies 
distribution. The positive coefficient of the ASL centred template dummy indicates that the 
provinces located in the regions that adopt such an organizational model, are less efficient than 
those that have opted for a Region centred template model. Our results seem to indicate that 
lodging decision making regarding the healthcare system at an intermediate level between ASLs 
and the central government allows for better planning and control of the available resources. 
Thus, while a degree of decentralization from the regional governments to local health units may 
indeed yield substantial gains for the health system, excessively decentralized health care may 
lead to serious difficulties [42]. Model B confirms all of the previous evidence, and it highlights 
the differences in the quality and quantity of the health care services offered by each region as 
source of inefficiency with a positive significant coefficient for the variable Interregional patients 
outflow and a negative significant coefficient for the variable Interregional patients inflow. Thus, 
a region characterized by patient mobility outside its borders should aim to increase the quality 
and/or the quantity of the health services it offers. However, as previously discussed, the law on 
fiscal federalism should avoid the “de facto” implementation of such changes to the system.  
Finally, we analyzed models C and D in order to evaluate the impact of different reimbursement 
systems. The analysis of the regression results for these two additional models indicates that the 
national reimbursement system produces a negative and significant impact on healthcare 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
 
efficiency. The cost adjusted system, which considers the regional health environment, allows 
regions to obtain a better input-output allocation. These results may be explained by the fact that 
defining the average cost to deliver care at national level fails to account for local characteristics 
related to population and health structures. The coefficient of the variable analytic is not 
significant, so policy conclusions regarding this variable cannot be drawn [43]. Models C and D 
confirm the previous findings for the remaining explicative variables. 
 
6. Conclusions and discussion 
Since 1992, a variety of reforms to the Italian SSN have aimed to transfer responsibility for 
organizing healthcare to the regions and to introduce the criteria advocated by managerialism into 
the system. Regional governments have become responsible for legislative and administrative 
functions, planning health care activities, organizing supply in relation to population needs and 
monitoring the quality, appropriateness and efficiency of the services provided. In this new 
environment, the regional governments have adopted different organizational models and 
alternative reimbursement systems. Examining the system at the level of the provinces, the 
territorial and administrative units of the Italian regions, this paper addresses the impact of the 
reforms on healthcare efficiency. This analysis was conducted by applying a two-stage DEA 
model. The analysis reveals that the organizational model adopted by only one region in the 
country, Lombardia, showed the greatest healthcare efficiency during the analyzed time span, 
2004-2005. This organizational model is characterized by a well-defined separation between 
health service providers and purchasers, and it is based on freedom of choice for users between 
public and private accredited providers. Moreover, the analysis indicates that a high level of 
administrative decentralization does not improve the delivery of healthcare services.  
Examining the three alternative reimbursement systems adopted in the Italian SSN, we observed 
that efficiency increases when the average cost to deliver care takes into account regional 
characteristics of the population and healthcare structures.  
Finally, we showed that provincial healthcare efficiency is increased by the influx of patients to a 
region (interregional patients inflows) and is decreased by the outflow of patients from a region 
(interregional patients outflow). The impact of patient mobility among regions will probably 
create the greatest challenges for the central government in future years due to the administrative 
and fiscal decentralization occurring in Italy. In this changed context, poorer regions, which are 
mostly located in the South of the country, may prove unable, without central government 
intervention, to offer adequate levels of health services, and as a consequence, their patient 
outflows could increase.  
Notably, our study focused on technical efficiency in healthcare systems employing physical 
variables and does not allow for the evaluation of allocative efficiency.  
A possible improvement to the present work will assess price data and population size [44]. 
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Fig. 1. Organizational models. 
 
 
   
Fig. 2.  Boostrap estimes of 95% confidences intervals, by organizational models. 
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Table 1 
 Regional differences, 2005. 
Region 
Organizational 
model 
Reimbursement 
system 
SNNa 
expenditure 
per capita 
Hospital 
beds per 
capita % 
Number 
of ASLs 
Interregional 
patients 
outflow 
Interregional 
patients  
inflow 
    
Piemonte ASL cent. Cost adjusted  1,655 0.33 22 8.43 7.29 
V. Aosta ASL cent. National 1,857 0.56 1 22.17 12.16 
Lombardia Purchaser-
provider 
Analytic 1,575 0.37 15 3.9 9.83 
 Bolzano ASL cent. National 2,076 0.41 4 4.58 11.47 
Trento ASL cent. National 1,721 0.4 1 17.78 11.45 
Veneto ASL cent.. Analytic 1,616 0.4 21 5.31 9.32 
Friuli Regional cent. National 1,658 0.36 6 6.34 9.35 
Liguria Regional cent. National 1,833 0.46 5 11.19 12.49 
Emilia R. ASL cent. Analytic 1,686 0.39 11 6.31 13.88 
Toscana ASL cent. Analytic 1,637 0.37 12 5.92 11.3 
Umbria ASL cent. Analytic 1,618 0.25 4 11.28 15.16 
Marche ASL cent. National 1,542 0.35 13 10.75 9.57 
Lazio ASL cent. Analytic 1,816 0.37 12 6.64 9.32 
Abruzzo Regional cent. National 1,700 0.36 6 10.2 13.38 
Molise Regional cent. National 1,854 0.49 4 20.62 24.64 
Campania Regional cent. National 1,603 0.25 13 7.55 2.86 
Puglia ASL cent. National 1,432 0.33 12 7.64 4.24 
Basilicata ASL cent. National 1,477 0.36 5 24.01 12.58 
Calabria ASL cent. National 1,404 0.27 11 14.82 4.42 
Sicilia Regional cent. Cost adjusted 1,556 0.32 9 6.09 2.09 
Sardegna ASL cent. National 1,593 0.9 8 4.24 2.24 
ITALIA   1,622 0.39 195 7.29 8.16 
NORTH   1,960 0.38 86 6.08 10.31 
CENTRE   1,653 0.36 41 7.33 10.34 
SOUTH     1,577 0.35 68 8.52 4.58 
a  Source: Ministry of Health. 
  
Table 2 
Summary of the models. 
  Model A Model B Model C Model D 
DEA 
analysis 
Inputs:     
Physicians X X X X 
Beds X X X X 
Nurses X X X X 
Outputs:     
Num. total patients X X X X 
Num. inpatient days   X X 
Two stage 
analysis 
Organizational models X X X X 
Reimbursement 
systems 
  X X 
Total mobility X  X  
Interregional mobility  X  X 
Year X X X X 
 
Table 3 
Descriptive statistics for DEA inputs and outputs and patient mobility. 
DEA analysis Mean Std. Dev. Median 
Physicians 1666 1893.79 1082 
Beds 2113 2386.25 1296 
Nurses 3842 3726.09 2647 
Num. total patients 104900 128005.5 61640 
Num. inpatient day 522000 632489.5 332300 
Two stage 
analysis 
ASL centred 
 template 
Region centred 
template 
Purchaser-provider  
split template 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Total patients outflow 22.75 10.40 24.93 13.61 22.81 10.34 
Total patients inflow 18.16 7.77 19.09 9.19 20.3 5.00 
Interregional patients 
outflow 
9.52 5.80 9.94 5.49 4.44 3.98 
Interregional patients 
inflow 
8.67 4.82 7.83 8.50 7.2 4.21 
 
  
Table 4 
Simar–Zelenyuk-adapted-Li test for equality of efficiency distributions. 
 
Null hypothesis Test statistics Bootstrap p-value 
Model A-B f (effPPST) = f (effRCT) 2.629 0.001 
 
f (effPPST) = f (effACT) 4.468 0.000 
 f (effACT) = f (effRCT) 2.693 0.027 
Model C-D f (effPPST) = f (effRCT) 2.629 0.000 
 
f (effPPST) = f (effACT) 4.468 0.000 
 f (effACT) = f (effRCT) 2.693 0.024 
Notes: f (eff) = the distribution of efficiency scores, PPST= Purchaser-provider split template, ACT= ASL 
Centred template, RCT= Region centred template. The number of bootstrap iterations is 1000.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 
Second stage results. 
 Estimates Lower Upper 
Model A    
Intercept 0.359 -0.117 0.880 
Total patients outflow  0.019
 c
 0.012 0.026 
Total patients inflow -0.015
 a -0.027 -0.002 
ASL centred template 0.481
 b
 0.222 0.717 
Purchaser-provider split 
template  
-1.986
 b
 -2.894 -0.605 
Year 0.392
 c
 0.178 0. 584 
Variance 0.463
 c
 0.384 0.584 
Model B    
Intercept 0.208 -0.262 0.810 
Interregional patients outflow 0.048 c 0.027 0.067 
Interregional patients inflow -0.028
 a
 -0.046 -0.004 
ASL centred template 0.461 
b
 0.161 0.704 
Purchaser-provider split 
template 
-2.058 
a
 -3.080 -0.422 
Year 0.456
 b
 0.209 0.679 
Variance 0.490
 c
 0.383 0.592 
Model C    
Intercept 0.515 
c
 0.168 0.900 
Total patients outflow  0.012 
c
 0.007 0.017 
Total patients inflow -0.012 
b
 -0.020 -0.003 
ASL centred template 0.320 
c
 0.015 0.490 
Purchaser-provider split 
template 
-1.464 
b
 -2.213 -0.470 
Year 0.292 
c
 0.161 0.427 
National 0.331 
b
 0.132 0.517 
Analytic -0.047 -0.267 0.151 
Variance 0.336 
c
 0.289 0.405 
Model D    
Intercept 0.462
 b
 0.102 0.871 
Interregional patients outflow  0.025
 b
 0.011 0.039 
Interregional patients inflow -0.029
 b
 -0,044 -0.011 
ASL centred template 0.294
 b
 0.105 0.466 
Purchaser-provider split 
template 
-1.768
 b
 -2.659 -0.503 
Year 0.342
 c
 0.179 0.504 
National 0.352
 b
 0.104 0.570 
Analytic 0.050 -0.224 0.286 
Variance 0.371
c
 0.303 0.449 
a
 Statistically significant at 10%. 
b
 Statistically significant at 5%. 
c 
Statistically significant at 1%. Estimates, 
Lower and Upper denotes the Estimates, the Lower bound and the Upper bound for 90-percent confidence 
intervals obtained by bootstrapping. 
 
